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Abstract
Does inequality fuel anti-globalization backlash?  This paper answers this question by analyzing how income 
inequality affects the embrace or eschew of globalization by political parties.  It focuses on party opposition to 
and support for trade openness, European-Union integration, and general internationalism in all party platforms of 
22 advanced-industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008.  The analysis considers how and under what condi-
tions inequality affects such position-taking.  The main ﬁ  nding is that inequality tends to increase parties’ anti-
globalization backlash, an effect that does not signiﬁ  cantly differ across party families or globalization exposure 
but does get diminished with more generous redistributional policies. These ﬁ  ndings clarify the nature and origins 
of anti-EU and other aspects of anti-globalization backlash, and suggest how socio-economic conditions may be 
central to such backlash. 
Word count (text, footnotes, references): 8713Page • 8
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A fundamental feature of political life involves how much national polities are open to global political and 
economic interaction. This is fundamental not least because it is a political choice with deep implications for 
wealth, peace and justice in the world.  It is also a political choice never to be taken for granted, as is already 
evidenced by the rise of anti-globalization, isolationist sentiments in the party politics of Europe and elsewhere. 
Recent increases in anti-immigration, anti-EU, protectionist, and general anti-internationalist position-taking by 
parties make it clear that the party-political basis for post-War pan-European and international economic and po-
litical engagement may be under threat.  To understand this threat, one needs to understand when, where and why 
political parties might support and oppose globalization. 
An often-discussed factor in such anti-globalization politics involves income inequality.  Income inequality 
has risen in most advanced industrial democracies in recent decades, broadly parallel to and possibly reﬂ  ecting 
increases in European and international economic and political engagement (e.g. Wood 1990; Beckﬁ  eld 2006). 
Whatever its origins, such inequality has extensive and far-reaching implications for polities – including subjective 
insecurity, more criminality, longer and more irregular working hours, shortened life-spans, declining social and 
political trust, and subjective unhappiness (Wilkinson 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2006; Chamlin and Cochran 
2006; Daly et.al.2001; Bell and Freeman 2001; Uslaner 2002; Rothstein et.al. 2005; Anderson and Singer 2008). 
As voters and their political representatives react to income inequality, they might well be expected to turn inward, 
retreating to familiar traditions on national shores rather than embracing global economic and political institutions 
and openness.  
Whether this is so, however, remains unknown in existing studies of inequality and political economy.  In the 
extensive attention to income inequalities, there has been little to consider their implications for anti-globalization 
backlash, and in the equally extensive literature on the politics of European and global integration there is little to 
explore whether support or opposition to such integration involves income distributions. The exceptions of note 
involve debate over inequality’s implications for ethnic and anti-immigrant attitudes (Bilal et.al. 2003; Gerritsen 
and Lubbers 2010; Green et.al.1998b). But there is virtual silence about inequality’s implications for other faces 
and manifestations of anti-globalization backlash, such as Euroskepticism among political parties. Such a silence 
may be surprising, but it is symptomatic of the relative paucity of studies applying sociological insights to study 
of political and economic integration (Favell and Guiraudon 2009).
This paper explores the role of inequality in shaping partisan support for and opposition to political and eco-
nomic globalization. It does so theoretically by articulating the plausible implications of inequality for the posi-
tioning of parties towards various aspects of anti-globalization backlash.  Exogenous sources of insecurities that Page • 10
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themselves increase anti-globalization backlash, such as already-existing economic openness, might have stronger 
positive effects on anti-globalization sentiment under conditions of higher inequality. But the paper develops the 
expectation that inequalities ought also to have direct effects for anti-globalization backlash. Whatever its origins, 
income inequality can undermine economic securities and generate economic and political uncertainties that likely 
alter the position-taking of parties on globalization:  leading them to consider options to redress these problems, 
among those options nationalist retreat. And inequalities may also give party entrepreneurs incentives and political 
opportunities to use anti-globalization sentiments as a form of blame avoidance and scape-goating. Such party re-
sponses to inequalities manifest themselves as nationalist backlash against global economic and political openness.   
Such party responses to inequalities, however, might be expected to differ across different party families and socio-
economic policies.  And they might particularly differ in the face of redistributive social policies: the reduction of 
inequalities through redistributive taxation and social policies might, net of their origins, diminish such insecurities 
in ways that plausibly reduce anti-globalization backlash.  
The empirical focus of the study, developed in section two below, is on how income inequality affects party 
positioning with respect to anti-globalization backlash, using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project on par-
ty platforms in 22 OECD countries between 1960 and 2008. I focus on several measures of net anti-globalization 
position-taking, based on how much a party’s platform expresses support for or opposition to trade protectionism, 
general international engagement, and European-Union integration. This gauges simple anti- or pro-globalization 
of parties in a given country and election-year.  It provides more nuanced understanding of pro- and anti-globali-
zation sentiment among parties than alternative measures, such as the existence or electoral success of fringe par-
ties.  And the measures provide leverage to consider variation in such sentiment over time and space, more than 
measures based on surveys or expert judgments. The explanatory analyses of these data, developed in sections 
two and three, focuses on how comparable measures of income inequality inﬂ  uence pro- and anti-globalization 
position-taking.
The principal conclusion of the empirical analysis is that income inequality tends to increase all measures of 
anti-globalization backlash in party platforms. Particularly with respect to net, or post tax and transfer, income 
inequality, political parties in settings with higher inequality tend to take more protectionist, anti-internationalist, 
anti-EU stances.  These effects are generally not, it appears, signiﬁ  cantly different across different party families 
or electoral fortunes of parties, nor across different settings with respect to ex ante trade openness, unemployment, 
growth, or political institutions. On the other hand, government redistributional policies via taxation and social 
policies do tend to diminish any anti-globalization backlash arising from (pre-tax, pre-transfer) inequality.  These Page • 11
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results suggest that income inequality, already found to generate a range of domestic problems, is also an important 
and to some extent preventable contributor to nationalist, anti-globalization backlash.Page • 12
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1.  Parties and Pro- and Anti-Globalization Position-
taking
How economic inequality inﬂ  uences the positions that political parties take on issues of economic and po-
litical openness is not obvious, a priori. One can expect domestic inequality to play an indirect role in shaping 
attitudes and partisan position-taking on globalization – by mediating the inﬂ  uence of background economic and 
political risk factors that themselves directly inﬂ  uence anti-globalization backlash.  For instance, ex ante ﬂ  ows of 
trade, capital or migration might well generate economic and political risks in a polity that can be expected to spur 
anti-globalization movements throughout a party system (Burgoon 2009a).  The degree to which such openness 
spurs anti-globalization backlash, however, might be mediated by the income inequality prevailing in a polity. 
Where openness unfolds in settings with high inequality, the latter might reveal or signal that globalization is not 
panning-out well for the polity.  And such can fuel sentiment and political mobilization against future openness – 
anti-globalization backlash, hence.
Whether inequality has direct effects for anti-globalization position-taking is more uncertain. Inequality, un-
moored from its own origins, might have no clear consequences for anti-globalization sentiments in a polity, and 
hence among parties.  Indeed, some studies of anti-minority, anti-immigrant attitudes and actions reason that gen-
eral economic deprivation can have many offsetting implications for such xenophobia such that general depriva-
tion has no signiﬁ  cant end effect on such anti-globalization feeling (Green et.al.1998a, 1998b). On the other hand, 
higher domestic inequality might plausibly increase support for international engagement and political institutions 
in order to compensate for the palpable economic failings of domestic governance and economic life.  Such logic 
ﬁ  ts the ﬁ  nding that publics support European-Union integration where home institutions are palpably wanting 
(Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). If so, one might hypothesize that inequality reduces anti-globalization sentiments and 
partisan position-taking.  
My own expectation, however, is that domestic inequality may well play out among citizens and their party 
representatives in ways that directly increase anti-globalization positioning by political parties. Further, I expect 
that these direct effects might well be mediated by the partisan orientation of parties and by the social-policy set-
ting within which parties respond to inequalities.  I lay out each of these expectations in turn.Page • 14
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1.1.  How inequality might spur anti-globalization backlash
Ex ante income inequalities can have strong direct effects on anti-globalization backlash via their effects on 
the preferences of voters and their party representatives. Net of its complicated origins, domestic income inequal-
ity has been shown in a range of studies to alter the economic preferences and sentiments of citizens, including 
higher preferred and actual working time, more subjective income insecurity and heightened stress (Bell and 
Freeman 2001; Alesina et.al.2004).  Such economic insecurities, in turn, can be expected to generate suspicion 
towards exposure to further global economic and political forces to the extent that past globalization has caused, 
or has been portrayed in the media and popular discussion to cause, income inequality. Such has long stated in 
much popular and scholarly political economy and media reporting, and may be politically salient regardless of 
the globalization in place in a given country-year (e.g. Beckﬁ  eld 2005; Wood 1995; Kapstein 1996; Helpman et.al. 
2008). If so, anti-globalization backlash might then be one of many possible ways of according blame to nega-
tive economic developments like inequality – where outside engagement and inﬂ  uences are the scapegoats for 
domestic inequality, along-side any other possible (domestic) scapegoats (Douglas 2005). Hence, at least part of 
the political reactions to domestic inequality can be anti-globalization backlash.
More importantly, several characteristics of human cognition, well-studied by social psychologists, might lead 
citizens to respond to domestic inequality by focusing disproportionately on external, foreign scapegoats – and, 
hence, on anti-globalization.  An old body of theorizing known as ‘frustration aggression displacement theory’ 
suggests that economic hardships can spark a displacement of aggression, where the scape-goating turns to outsid-
ers and external forces to one’s own decision-making and volition (Dollard et.al.1939).   More recent ‘social iden-
tity theory’ suggests that people dealing with hardships tend to blame out-groups to preserve their social identity 
(Tajfel 1981).  And work within ‘relative deprivation theory’ suggests how economic conditions and feelings of 
deprivation relative to other groups, particularly out-groups, can involve non-rational scape-goating of the latter to 
emotionally cope with economic hardships (Brown 1988; Runciman 1966; Tchitereke 2001; and De la Rey 1991). 
Related to these views is “attribution theory,” an approach that suggest the strongest direct link of inequality 
to anti-globalization sentiment. Attribution theory focuses on how individuals make sense of and explain their 
individual position by attributing that position to factors that are (among other things) either internal or external 
to an individual’s own volition and control (Kelley 1967; Weiner 1992).  Attribution is often self-serving, where 
negative developments are attributed to external factors while positive developments to internal factors of the in-
dividual’s own doing (Hewstone 1983). And this line of argument extends to the way negative developments are 
often attributed to out-groups and positive developments to in-groups, such that scape-goating tends to implicate Page • 15
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out-groups more readily than in-groups (Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Poppe 2001).  By this logic, individuals or poli-
ties judging economic inequality to be a negative development are likely to attribute this to out-groups and foreign 
inﬂ  uence, a process that can be expected to spur scepticism towards economic or political global contacts.
Empirically, social-psychological research has found signs of links between inequalities and other economic 
hardships to a range of acts and/or sentiments that are part of, or isomorphic to, anti-globalization backlash.  Analy-
sis of a range of national settings, using diverse methods, has found economic hardship generally and income 
inequality in particular to be sources of racist and ethno-centrist beliefs and violence (Glick 2005; Duckitt 1994); 
of anti-immigrant attitudes and violence (Poppe 2001; Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999; Burns 2008; Crush and Pen-
dleton 2007; Bilal et.al 2003; O’Connell 2005); of distrust of other national populations (Gerritsen and Lubbers 
2010); and of scepticism towards various aspects of European integration (Hobolt and Lablond 2009; Burgoon 
2009b; Cosmina and Colonescu 2008). Some of these ﬁ  ndings are not without dispute, as some ﬁ  nd only weak 
correlation between economic hardships and xenophobia (Green et.al. 1998a, 1998b; Krueger and Pischke 1997).
Accepting that there is debate about these empirical referents and the theoretical logic underlying it, attribu-
tion theory supports the expectation that voters within the polity will tend react to income inequality, whatever 
its origins and hence non-rationally, with sentiments that are more anti-foreigner, anti-global engagement than 
would otherwise obtain.  If so, these reactions of citizens may be taken-up by representatives of political parties 
seeking votes of such citizens, a process that might well differ by party and circumstance, an issue to which I will 
turn momentarily.  But if the median voter is likely to respond to economic inequalities and insecurities in ways 
that involve anti-globalization sentiment, then most political party platforms will tend also to express more anti-
globalization sentiment. 
Representatives of political parties may also respond to less directed voter discontent surrounding economic 
inequality by looking for ways to avoid political blame – such blame-avoidance being a hallmark of legislative vo-
lition (Mayhew 1974; Weaver 1986). This could involve party-political scape-goating autonomous from the social 
psychology of individuals experiencing economic hardship. The problems and divisions that inequality signals to 
political entrepreneurs should spark partisan search for politically-winning answers, and their search and choices 
can include anti-globalization that shapes or cues political mobilization to secure votes and win elections (c.f. 
Netjes and Edwards 2006; Steenbergen et.al.2007).  By this logic, partisan anti-globalization positioning reﬂ  ects 
not so much an aggregation of voter discontent as exploitation of it (Betz 1994; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Such 
more cynical, strategic-positioning among party representatives underlie the same broad expectation emerging Page • 16
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from social psychology of citizens in high-inequality settings: ex ante income inequality can be expected to spur 
partisan anti-globalization position-taking.  Both logics underlie the ﬁ  rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:
Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, yield higher economic insecurities, uncertainty and hardship 
that spark scape-goating of out-groups that includes anti-globalization position-taking among political parties.
1.2.  How partisanship and redistribution might mediate the effects of inequality 
Although inequality might increase anti-globalization position taking in general, as reasoned above, the de-
gree to which it does so may be mediated by third political and policy conditions.  Most obviously, differences in 
the ideologies and constituencies of political parties suggest that Left-Right partisanship will shape how parties 
respond to inequalities.  Such partisanship involves starkly contrasting ideologies with respect to the role of gov-
ernment and with respect to markets, but also with respect to moral or cultural traditionalism and diversity (c.f. 
Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Kriesi et.al. 2006; and Van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). In light of the former 
Left-Right cleavage, Left-oriented parties beholden to the likely losers of rising inequality and champions of gov-
ernment interventions to redress inequality will be quicker to frame higher income inequality as a salient political 
problem than do non-Left parties.  Combined with the logic underlying Hypothesis One, one might then expect 
Left-parties to more sharply respond to inequality with stronger out-group scape-goating and anti-globalization 
position-taking than their Center- or Right-party counterparts.  This expectation is reinforced by how Left parties 
disproportionately represent losers of economic globalization compared to non-Left parties (Dutt and Mitra 2005; 
Burgoon 2012 forthcoming).  Both logics provide the basis for a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a:
Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Left 
political parties compared to non-Left parties.
In light of the more cultural dimension of Left-Right partisanship – where Right parties, particularly extremist-
right and nationalist parties disproportionately embrace traditional national culture and values – Right parties 
should more readily seize-upon higher economic inequality as a problem justifying retreat from international 
economic and political engagement, hence sparking anti-globalization positioning. And if party entrepreneurs are 
mainly opportunistic rather than responding to democratic pressures, inequality may spark anti-globalization po-Page • 17
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sition-taking particularly among extreme-right, nationalist parties with a long proﬁ  le of championing the national 
and local. This suggests a second partisan-mediation hypothesis in partial tension with the ﬁ  rst:
Hypothesis 2b:
Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, spark stronger anti-globalization position-taking among Right 
political parties compared to non-Right parties.
This Hypothesis is not fully in tension with Hypothesis 2a, insofar as the extremes of the Left-Right party 
continuum can include parties responding in line with Hypothesis 2a and 2b, respectively.  This would show up, 
for instance, in extreme left parties (e.g. former Communist parties) and extreme Right parties (e.g. right-wing na-
tionalist parties) responding to inequality with the most anti-globalization position-taking, relative to mainstream 
parties (e.g. Liberal, Social-Democratic, Christian-democratic parties).  
Finally, inequality may inﬂ  uence anti-globalization backlash in ways mediated by redistributional tax provi-
sions and social-policy protections that might remedy market-driven inequalities.  In particular, pre-tax and pre-
transfer income inequality, or gross income inequality, can be expected to spark downstream political mobilization 
by parties to the extent that the insecurities of individuals are left as is, as it were left to fester.  To the extent that 
social policies actually cushion or compensate for market inequality, they should diminish how much that inequal-
ity spurs anti-globalization backlash (Ruggie 1982; Bordo et.al. 2002).  Such policies can include redistributive 
taxes or broad social transfers, but they may also include policies facilitating economic adjustment, such as unem-
ployment insurance providing time and resources to adjust, or active-labor-market programs providing training to 
adjust.  Hence, we have an hypothesis about gross inequality: 
Hypothesis 3a:
Higher pre-tax, pre-transfer income inequality should, all other things equal, spark less anti-globalization position-
taking to the extent that tax-transfer social policies and taxation systems are redistributive and generous to poorer 
citizens.
Finally, how much government policies lower gross inequality (captured by the gap between pre- and post-
tax-transfer income inequality) may directly signal effectiveness in cushioning the many sources of insecurities, 
and thereby diminish downstream nationalism. This follows from the converse of the arguments underlying Hy-
pothesis One above: the ability of national policies to redress gross inequalities alleviate economic hardship should Page • 18
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directly diminish scape-goating and anti-globalization backlash among citizens and their partisan representatives.   
This provides a basis for a ﬁ  nal Hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3b:
Greater redistribution, as shown by the difference between pre-and post-tax-and-transfer inecome inequality, 
should, all other things equal, diminish anti-globalization position-taking.Page • 19
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2.  Anti-globalization position-taking and Income 
Inequality in Industrialized Countries
To empirically test these expectations, I analyze how inequality inﬂ  uences the anti-globalization orientation 
of parties in advanced-industrial democracies.  This approach skips-over individual or party-leader sentiments 
underlying the logic of the Hypotheses above, as well as policy outputs of anti-globalization backlash, such as 
trade protectionism or national retreat from EU or other international organizations.  But the approach focuses on 
important manifestations of anti-globalization backlash, of intrinsic value in understanding European and globali-
zation politics and relevant to policy outputs in those polities.  
The analysis focuses on party platforms of all parties in 22 countries1 from 1960 to 2008. The data come from 
the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset (and its 2007 and 2010 updates), which measures party posi-
tion-taking on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) about an issue as a percentage of 
total sentences in the manifesto (Budge et.al., 2001; Klingemann et.al.2007; Laver and Garry 2000). The measures 
capture salience of an issue to a party.  But for some issues, the CMP separately measures positive and negative 
statements about policy, whereby scores gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular programs (Milner 
and Judkins, 2004). Such measures may canvass party wishes more than do activities in power, where initiatives 
reﬂ  ect constraints and demands of coalition partners.2  Some research has also found that in various domains mani-
festo scores predict party behavior in ofﬁ  ce (Brauninger, 2005; Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Klingemann et.al., 
1994), something emerging from the present data (see below). Using these data, in any event, I can measure party 
positions on anti-globalization position-taking and estimated this as a function of income inequality to explore and 
test Hypotheses One through Three.
2.1.  Dependent variables: Anti-globalization in Party Platforms
The CMP data provide relevant and systematic measures to offer leverage to quantify anti-globalization across 
countries, parties, and time, and to judge how traditional party families relate to such position-taking.  I construct a 
composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of platforms that gauge economic and political 
1  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
2  The coded CMP coding may suffer from measurement error and/or unreliability, as some research has shown with respect to subjective 
coding of the ‘left-right’ composite (Mikhaylov et al., 2008; Benoit et.al., 2009). However, the scale and implications of this for simpler 
measures built here remain unclear, and do not disqualify the CMP for systematic appraisal of party support for anti-globalization with 
broad cross-country and longitudinal coverage.Page • 20
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isolation3: (1) Net protectionism, support for and opposition to trade protectionism (per406 and per407, respective-
ly); (2) Net anti-internationalism, opposition to and support for international institutions and global engagement 
(per109 and per107, respectively, in the CMP codes); and (3) and Net anti-European Union, opposition to and 
support for broader and deeper European integration (per110 and per108, respectively). These dimensions of anti-
globalization are positively correlated with one another, but not very highly so (see, for instance, Appendix Two, 
left panel) – a reminder of how position-taking on faces of globalization can and do vary in how they cleave politi-
cal actors.  Unfortunately, the CMP data provide no other measures explicitly focused on support for or opposition 
to international economic or political inﬂ  uences, such as immigration.  Still the pro- and anti-internationalism and 
protectionism dimensions provide leverage to capture position-taking towards not only a speciﬁ  c economic face of 
globalization – trade protectionism and free-trade-ism – but also a broader statement of support for European and 
international institutions and global engagement.
Based on these platforms, all expressed as sentences and quasi-sentences as a percentage of total platform sen-
tences, I construct two composite measures: Net anti-globalization (narrow): (per406 + per109) - (per407+per107); 
and Net anti-globalization (broad): (per406 + per109+per110) - (per407+per107+per108). Consistent with the 
convention in other studies using platform data, I treat the components as additive because they are all on the same 
salience scale of a party’s platform rather than simply related components on different dimensions or scales (e.g. 
Budge et al 2001; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). In sensitivity checks, I consider other speciﬁ  cations, including 
measures that standardize the components composing the composites to take alternative account of how parties 
might give more attention to some aspects of anti-globalization than others. This said, all the above backlash mea-
sures vary, in theory, from -100 to +100 percent of a platform, capturing how much a given party in a given election 
prioritizes anti- versus pro-globalization: Positive values represent net support for anti-globalization, and negative 
values represent net opposition to such anti-globalization.  While intrinsically important to the political climate 
surrounding globalization in a given party system, such values also correlate positively with measures of policy 
outputs related to globalization, such as later trade ﬂ  ows or composite measures of actual globalization exposure 
(see Appendix Two, right panel).  
The measures of anti-globalization position-taking vary substantially over time, country, and between parties 
in a given country-year.4 The full sample (1481 party-country-year observations) of Net anti-globalization (nar-
row), for instance, has a mean of -2.198 (hence, the average party platform tending to be modestly pro-globaliza-
tion the net). But this masks high sample dispersion (standard deviation of 3.5), ranging from -21.95 (Swedish 
3   See Appendix One for a detailed wording of these platform elements.
4   Appendix Three provides the summary statistics.Page • 21
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Liberals in 1964 and the Japanese Renewal Party in 1993) – more than 20 percent of platforms being devoted to 
pro-free trade and internationalism net of any protectionist or anti-internationalist statements – to a maximum of 
42.76 (Belgian “Walloon Rally” in 1978).
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2.2.  Independent variables: Inequality and controls
Income Inequality. To measure income inequality, I use the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID), based on the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database and the Luxembourg In-
come Study (Solt 2009).  The data improve cross-national and over-time comparability of the WIID data among 
sample countries and provide country-year measures of uncertainty in inequality measures.  They provide a strong 
basis for comparing the OECD countries and years of the CMP data with respect to both pre- and post-tax and 
transfer income inequality.  I focus particularly on the Net Gini scores, measures of net income inequality (post 
tax and transfer), but I also consider the implications of Gross Gini scores (pre tax and transfer inequality).  For 
all estimations, I also include the SWIID measures of uncertainty of the country-year scores.  The SWIID data-
base also provides measure of tax-and-transfer Redistribution, based on the difference between Gross Gini scores 
and Net Gini scores, capturing how much market inequality is lowered by redistributive taxes and social-policy Page • 22
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transfers. In sensitivity checks, I also consider other measures of inequality, including the original Deininger and 
Squire data, and measures of income spread and the structure of inequality, such as 90/50 and 50/10 spreads (Lupu 
and Pontusson 2011).
The Net Gini score range from 19.7 (Sweden in 1982) to 37.25 (Portugal in 2005), with a sample mean of 
27.94 (standard deviation 4.1), providing a good basis to explore whether income inequality inﬂ  uences partisan 
anti-globalization position-taking. To give a very broad sense of how this, Figure 1 captures how the party-system 
means of Net Gini scores, averaged from 1980 to 2008, correlate with party-system means for Net anti-globaliza-
tion (broad). The expectation, as discussed above, is that this relationship be positive, as is indeed the case, though 
not signiﬁ  cantly so (R-square of .123). A similar story emerges from another descriptive-statistical snapshot of 
over-time changes in inequality and Net anti-globalization (broad) within each of the 22 sample countries (see 
Appendix Four below).  The relevant measure of the relationship between inequality and party position-taking on 
globalization, of course, takes account the position-taking of different parties across countries and time, and con-
trolling for the inﬂ  uence of other conditions.
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To consider Hypotheses 2 (a and b) and 3 (a and b), I consider measures of two sets of possible mediating 
conditions: partisan identity and of social-policy generosity and redistribution, respectively. Party identity and par-
tisanship I measure, ﬁ  rst, by focusing on seven party families: (1) (Former) Communist parties; (2) Social Demo-
cratic parties; (3) Green parties; (4) Christian Democratic parties; (5) Conservative Parties; (6) Liberal parties; and 
(7) Nationalist extreme-right parties (Lubbers et.al. 2002; Swank and Betz 2003; Mudde 2007; Carter 2005).5  I 
also focus on Left-to-Right partisanship that varies across time and party identity, based on the measure developed 
by Laver and Budge (1992), Laver and Garry (2000), but removing those components constituting this study’s 
measure of Net anti-globalization –support for and opposition to internationalism and protectionism.  With these 
changes, I generate a measure of Right partisanship, higher scores representing higher priority to Right positions, 
and lower or negative scores suggesting more priority to Left positions.6
  To measure social-policy generosity I focus primarily on Social security transfers as percentage of GDP 
(OECD, various years) measure unemployment, social-security, health and other transfers of welfare-state gen-
erosity with the best coverage. This measure imperfectly captures generosity, but is a very visible and concrete 
means by which polities might gauge welfare effort. Between 1960 and 2003, the sample mean is 13 percent, rang-
ing from 3.7 percent (Japan in 1963) to 27.3 percent (Netherlands 1982). I also compare the baseline results using 
this measure of generosity with measures of unemployment-related spending and of vocational enrolment.
  Controls. To address whether inequality inﬂ  uences partisan sentiments on globalization, it is important to 
control for a range of conditions that plausibly affect inequalities and anti-globalization position-taking.  Important 
controls include the party-family dummies and social security transfers just discussed, but a number of others enter 
the baseline models. Trade Flows are exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP, with a sample mean of 65.6, 
a minimum of 9.1 and a maximum of 239.8 (Heston et.al. 2002). Old-age population, is proportion of the popu-
lation 65 and older, and can inﬂ  uence entrance into exposed sectors and has been shown to correlate negatively 
with support for extreme right parties (OECD, various years). Seats in parliament capture a party’s proportion of 
seats in parliament in the previous election, measuring how much parties take positions that are genuine policy-
making resolutions as opposed to “grand standing” (Sartori, 1976). GDP growth captures how business cycles 
affect economic risks and perspectives of parties on how much globalization to champion (Heston et.al., 2002). 
Unemployment rate captures background socio-economic conditions, net of the simple business cycle, that some 
studies have found to inﬂ  uence anti- globalization positions (OECD, various). Finally, I consider total number of 
5  That last is the most complicated, including not only the CMP coding of “national” or nationalist parties but also parties listed as extreme-
right nationalist parties by scholars of such. Where necessary, the parties in question are then coded as 0 for other party families in the 
default CMP categorization, for instance the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn.
6  Right partisanship = (per104 +per201 +per203 +per305 +per401 +per402 +per414 +per505 +per601 +per603 +per605 +per606) - (per1
03+per105+per106+per403+per404+per412 +per413 +per504 +per506 +per701 +per202). Page • 24
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sentences and the percentage un-coded sentences in manifestos to address possible measurement error, on grounds 
that these capture more difﬁ  cult-to-code documents.
2.3.  Estimation approach 
The above parameters constitute an unbalanced panel of party-country-years.  The panel is unit-dominated 
– with some 200 parties in 22 countries as units, and between 2 and 15 elections per party (8 on average) – and 
the number and spread of years per unit is uneven given the unique spread of elections in different countries. Es-
timation in light of the multi-level nature of the data should consider how inequality can have country-speciﬁ  c or 
party-speciﬁ  c effects.  The baseline estimations do so via two level random-intercept maximum likelihood models 
(parties within countries).  I lag all right-hand-side country-year measures by one year, to address possible endo-
geneity and the time it takes parties to absorb political-economic developments.7  Given uneven distributions of 
elections over time, I use a year-count to account for possible trend effects. In robustness tests discussed below I 
also consider a range of alternative speciﬁ  cations and estimators. Using this broad estimation approach, the ﬁ  rst 
set of models consider the direct effects of inequality on different aspects of anti-globalization positioning, to test 
Hypothesis One.  The second set considers whether partisan identity and orientation mediates the role of inequal-
ity, to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b. And the third and ﬁ  nal set of models considers the possible mediating role of 
social-policy generosity and redistribution, to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.
7  Any possible endogeneity due to simultaneity between anti-globalization position-taking and inequality is less likely to emerge, to the 
extent that the likely tendency of globalization to modestly spur domestic inequality (e.g. Beckﬁ  eld 2006) would suggest any resulting 
bias to be negative, that is overstating a negative relationship between ex ante inequality and anti-globalization.Page • 25
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3.  Results and discussion: Does Inequality Influence 
Anti-globalization Position-taking?
The main results relevant to Hypothesis One are summarized in Table One.  All reported models include the 
same benchmark estimation of the effects of Net Gini scores (post tax and transfer inequality) and the full battery 
of controls, but focus on different measures of anti-globalization position-taking.  Models 1 through 3 consider 
the components of anti-globalization sentiment: (1) Net protectionism; (2) Net anti-internationalism; and (3) Anti-
European Union.  Models 4-6, then, summarize results for additive composites of these three measures:  Model 4 
estimates Net anti-globalization (narrow) applied to the full sample of countries.  Model 5 estimates Net anti-glo-
balization (broad) on the full sample again, even though position-taking on the EU is certainly different for actual 
or potential members of EU institutions than for non-European polities.  Despite such differences, support for EU 
integration among non-European states can still be construed as an important kind of support for internationalism. 
Model 6, in any event, reanalyzes Net anti-globalization (broad) applied to only European countries. 
Across the various estimations, controls perform broadly in line with expectation. The political party-families 
perform with the recognizable U-shaped distribution across the Left-Right political spectrum – the most anti-
globalization parties being the extremes on the left and right, while the strongest supporters of globalization tend 
to be the Center Left and Right (Burgoon 2011).  Larger dependent populations tend to spur support for anti-
globalization among parties, as does the rise of service-sector employment (decline of manufacturing and agri-
culture).  Parties with more seats in parliament, and in settings with more female legislators, and in party-systems 
with more parties, tend to be modestly less anti-globalization.  Existing levels of trade openness (net of inequality) 
tend to have no signiﬁ  cant effect on anti-globalization, though is positively signed; and social transfers tend to 
be negatively signed but insigniﬁ  cant. More surprising is that unemployment levels and GDP growth tend not to 
signiﬁ  cantly alter anti-globalization sentiment in parties – at least net of inequality. Page • 26
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Table 1: Net anti-globalization position-taking and Net Income Inequality
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













GINI INDEX  0.026* 0.116*** 0.067** 0.157*** 0.221*** 0.179***
(POST-TAX POST-TRANSFER) (0.014) (0.037) (0.031) (0.040) (0.052) (0.062)
NATIONALIST-RIGHT 0.215 0.932** 1.338*** 1.167*** 2.508*** 2.108***
(0.167) (0.388) (0.337) (0.412) (0.556) (0.584)
CONSERVATIVE -0.234* -0.218 -1.056*** -0.429 -1.533*** -1.854***
(0.137) (0.313) (0.273) (0.333) (0.451) (0.541)
LIBERAL -0.254** -1.089*** -1.302*** -1.293*** -2.624*** -3.187***
(0.129) (0.298) (0.259) (0.316) (0.428) (0.473)
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC -0.043 -1.240*** -1.145*** -1.258*** -2.420*** -2.912***
(0.140) (0.323) (0.281) (0.343) (0.464) (0.512)
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC 0.020 -1.157*** -0.785*** -1.117*** -1.925*** -2.364***
(0.125) (0.288) (0.250) (0.306) (0.414) (0.497)
GREEN -0.099 -1.837*** 0.380 -1.927*** -1.553*** -2.077***
(0.175) (0.403) (0.351) (0.429) (0.579) (0.629)
(FORMER) COMMUNIST 0.045 -0.149 1.375*** -0.085 1.282*** 0.876*
(0.133) (0.308) (0.268) (0.328) (0.443) (0.487)
TRADE OPENNESS T-1 -0.002 0.015** 0.000 0.011 0.013 0.009
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
SOCIAL TRANSFERS T-1 -0.000 -0.036 0.002 -0.031 -0.019 -0.031
(0.014) (0.035) (0.029) (0.037) (0.049) (0.054)
UNEMPLOYMENT T-1 -0.013 0.053 -0.091*** 0.023 -0.052 -0.071
(0.012) (0.032) (0.027) (0.035) (0.045) (0.048)
GDP GROWTH T-1 0.025 -0.015 0.053 0.008 0.059 -0.018
(0.018) (0.041) (0.036) (0.044) (0.059) (0.070)
DEPENDENT POPULATION T-1 5.625*** 8.423 -1.001 15.426*** 12.099 9.817
(2.109) (5.527) (4.619) (5.943) (7.753) (8.943)
SEATS T-1 -0.736*** -0.179 -0.447 -0.861 -1.341 -1.168
(0.248) (0.569) (0.496) (0.605) (0.819) (1.033)
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENTT-1 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.020 -0.010 -0.035 -0.056**
(0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTI-
EST-1 0.011 -0.240** -0.084 -0.241** -0.258* -0.149
(0.034) (0.099) (0.080) (0.107) (0.136) (0.147)
SERVICE EMPLOYMENTT-1 2.253** 1.456 5.807** 8.377** 8.032* 1.726
(0.912) (3.402) (2.464) (3.841) (4.355) (5.147)
PERCENT UNCODED -0.002 0.012** 0.002 0.012** 0.012* 0.017**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
TOTAL SENTENCES (LOG) -0.085** -0.341*** -0.321*** -0.416*** -0.739*** -0.779***
(0.036) (0.089) (0.076) (0.095) (0.126) (0.144)
YEAR -0.008 -0.028 -0.023 -0.065** -0.054 0.012
(0.008) (0.025) (0.019) (0.027) (0.033) (0.038)
GINI UNCERTAINTY -0.072 -0.300** -0.110 -0.387*** -0.498** -0.514**
(0.059) (0.140) (0.121) (0.149) (0.200) (0.212)
CONSTANT 12.255 48.269 42.709 117.104** 94.930 -28.665
(15.575) (47.695) (36.801) (52.938) (63.421) (73.577)
LOG-LIKELIHOOD -2430.4 -3652.7 -3446.5 -3744.6 -4185.3 -3406.2
OBSERVATIONS 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,190
NUMBER OF GROUPS 22 22 22 22 22 17
All models: Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Page • 27
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The most important ﬁ  nding revealed by the various models is simple:  net income inequality tends to increase 
anti-globalization position-taking.  Although the substantive size and signiﬁ  cance varies substantially across these 
anti-globalization measures – something that can be directly compared with the common scales –  Net Gini scores 
meet standard thresholds of signiﬁ  cance in all the models.  The effects are weakest for Net trade protection and 
strongest for Net anti internationalism.  The results for the composites suggest that inequality’s spurring of anti-
globalization are, in a broad sense, additive:  the results are stronger for all three models with the composites of 
anti-globalization, strongest for the full composite Net anti-globalization (broad) on the full sample (model 5).   
These results provide consistent support for the general expectation developed above that net income inequality 
can meaningfully increase anti-globalization backlash.
Whatever the stability and signiﬁ  cance of these effects, their substantive size are meaningful but modest.   
Figure Two below summarizes such size by focusing on Net anti-globalization (broad) in the full sample of par-
ties and countries (model 5 in Table One).  Shown are the predicted values of such anti-globalization across the 
full range of the sample variation in net inequality.  Shown also are the 95-percent upper- and lower-conﬁ  dence 
intervals in the full distribution (Tomz et.al. 2000). 
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The sample’s full variation in net income inequality – ranging from Swedish 1980s inequality to Portugal’s 
2005 inequality – predicts an increase in Net anti-globalization position-taking from -5.6 to about -1, a decrease 
in support for globalization (increase in “ anti-globalization”) that corresponds to moving from roughly the 25th to 
the 70th percentile of the sample distribution of Net anti-globalization (broad).  The increases in globalization that 
a given country can be expected to undergo judging by the sample experiences, however, suggests an appreciably 
more modest effect of inequality, with the increase in US inequality in the last decade predicting an increase in Net 
anti-globalization from -2.7 to -1.2 (roughly the 60th to the 65th percentile in the sample distribution of such anti-
globalization position-taking).  This is modest, to be sure, but not trivial in terms of the sample distribution.  How 
this translates into actual shouting, hemming and hawing about trade, European integration and/or global engage-
ment generally, is more difﬁ  cult to surmise from these data.  But even here, substantial party ink is being spilt on 
anti-globalization in the face of rising inequality.  
Beyond the direct relationship between inequality and anti-globalization position-taking, I also considered a 
range of ways in which that relationship might be mediated by other forces.  Many aspects of such mediation are 
intuitively plausible but turn out empirically to be very modest or non-existent.  For instance, measures of ex ante 
actual exposure to trade, capital, or immigration – or composite measures of such, such as the KOF globalization 
index (Dreher 2006) – are quite highly correlated with inequality, and in any event do not interact signiﬁ  cantly 
with inequality in shaping anti-globalization.  These and many other interactions yield inequality to strongly spur 
anti-globalization sentiment regardless of most party-speciﬁ  c or national circumstances already presented in Table 
One.  
Table Two, in any event, summarizes the results of testing Hypotheses Two (a) and (b), addressing whether 
inequality has effects that differ across different kinds of parties with respect to the Left to Right political spec-
trum.  This estimation is accomplished by considering interaction between party-family identity and Net Gini 
scores. Also considered is whether a single measure of Right partisanship – based on position-taking by parties 
in a given election, hence varying also over time – alters the effect of inequalities.  As the Table makes clear, 
however, inequality does not emerge as having very different effects across parties. We do see that inequality is 
likely to more strongly spur anti-globalization position-taking by Conservative parties than other parties (model 
2).  And we see that inequality is likely to more strongly spur Net anti-globalization as one moves from Left to 
Right on Right partisanship. These are hints of support for Hypothesis Two (b), but far from uniform.  There is, in 
any event, no support for Hypothesis Two (a), that Left parties might be more likely than Right parties to embrace 
anti-globalization in the face of inequality.Page • 29
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Table 2: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Inequality-Partisanship interaction
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
GINI INDEX  0.225*** 0.178*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.227*** 0.210*** 0.205*** 0.196***
(POST-TAX POST-TRANSFER) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067)
NATIONALIST-RIGHT 5.462
(3.514)


























RIGHT PARTISANSHIP (L-R) -0.077*
(0.043)
GINI× RIGHT PARTISANSHIP 0.003**
(0.002)
Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad)
All models: All non-partisan controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown). Maximum-likelihood 
random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, Table Three summarizes results of exploration of Hypotheses Three (a) and (b), about whether in-
equality’s effects are likely to be rendered more modest by redistributional policies.  First, I consider whether 
pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality (“Gross Gini index scores”) have less positive or more negative effects for Net 
anti-globalization in settings where social policies are more generous.  Models 1 to 3 in Table Three consider the 
possible mediating effects of three measures of social-policy protection or generosity: in model (1) social transfers 
(already in the benchmark models in Table One); in model (2) UI-ALMP, spending on unemployment insurance 
and active labor market policies as a percentage of GDP (data from OECD 2011) to capture effects of labor-Page • 30
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focused spending; and model (3) Vocational trainees, the percentage of secondary-school students enrolled in 
vocational training programs (data from Lupu and Pontusson 2011).  As is clear from all three such tests, the effect 
of Gross Gini scores on anti-globalization are indeed substantially and signiﬁ  cantly smaller in times and places 
where social policy is more generous.  These provide broad support for Hypothesis Three (a).  Although this is not 
immediately clear from the tabular results, further analysis of the interaction between inequality and inequality, 
summarized in Figure Three below, reveals that at any level of social-security transfers below the 49th percentile, 
inequality signiﬁ  cantly increases anti-globalization backlash (broad).  Above that level of social protection, how-
ever, gross inequality no longer has such a signiﬁ  cant positive effect (Brambor et.al. 2005).
Table 3: Net anti-globalization position-taking (broad) and Social policy Redistribution
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
GINI INDEX  0.200** 0.198** 0.175***
(PRE-TAX PRE-TRANSFER) (0.088) (0.099) (0.062)
SOCIAL TRANSFERS T-1 0.446*
(0.258)






VOCATIONAL TRAINEES T-1 0.183**
(0.080)
GINI× VOCATIONAL TRAINEES -0.006***
(0.002)
REDISTRIBUTION T-1 -0.065***
(REDUCTION IN GROSS GINI) (0.025)
OBSERVATIONS 1,472 832 1,239 1,136
NUMBER OF GROUPS 22 22 19 21
Dependent variable: Net anti-globalization (broad)
All models: All non-social-policy controls identical to those in Table One (results not shown). 
Maximum-likelihood random-intercept model grouped by country (two-level).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Page • 31
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Figure 3: How Social-security transfers reduce the effect of Gross Inequality on Anti-globalization
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Thick dashed lines give 90% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of social-security transfers
Second, the Table considers the direct measure actual reduction inequality resulting from all tax and social-
policy transfer programs, drawing on the measure of the pre-tax-pre-transfer inequality on the one hand and post-
tax-post-transfer inequality on the other (SWIID 2009).  Hypothesis Three (b) expects that settings where this 
reduction in inequality is greater are settings that are less likely to have parties embracing anti-globalization 
backlash.  This is, indeed, what emerges from the data, as model 4 summarizes. We have, hence, support also for 
Hypothesis Three (b).
All these reported results are robust to a range of alternative speciﬁ  cations and estimators. First, they hold 
up to removing any or all right-hand side controls; adding other speciﬁ  cations of controls (e.g. other measures 
of globalization, like the KOF index, capital openness or immigration); running the models with ﬁ  xed country or 
party-family effects; removing outliers in the anti-globalization backlash or inequality measures; removing (step-
wise) any one country from the sample (or jack-kniﬁ  ng standard errors).
Second, the results hold upon looking at other measures of anti-globalization positioning.  This applies to 
focusing on only the protectionism, anti-internationalism, or anti-EU without taking further account of pro-free-
trade, pro-internationalism, or pro-EU statements.  The results are virtually identical using other measurements of 
composite Net anti-globalization, for instance standardizing the components before their addition, whereby the Page • 32
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relatively greater platform attention to (for instance) the EU does not drive results. Third, similar results emerge 
from alternative measures of inequality, such as the raw WIID database on Gini or p90/p10 spreads, despite their 
problems with cross-national and/or longitudinal comparability.  And study of the structure of inequality – such as 
inequality at the upper-end of the distribution relative to the median, as opposed to inequality at the lower-end of 
the distribution relative to the median – reveals that particularly upper-register inequality spurs anti-globalization.   
This is not surprising given that such inequality is what has most grown in recent decades in OECD settings.  
Third, the results are robust to alternative estimators.  Results are very similar in random-coefﬁ  cient, random-
intercept models, where such models converge. They are also very similar in other embedding structures of multi-
level models, such as three-level models of parties within party families within countries, or of parties within a 
given election-year of a country.  The results are also robust to OLS ﬁ  xed effects with clustering of standard errors 
by country, FGLS, panel-corrected standard errors, and lagged dependent variables. Such insensitivity and robust-
ness to the basic patterns suggest that the messages emerging from Tables One to Three are not simple artifacts of 
statistical technique.Page • 33
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4.  Conclusion 
  This study has explored whether and under what conditions income inequality inﬂ  uences party position-
taking on anti-globalization backlash.  The theoretical insights focus on the possibilities that domestic inequality, 
whatever its origins, can spark feelings of insecurity and deprivation, and in turn unleash attribution or scape-
goating of out-groups that manifest themselves in anti-globalization backlash.  The empirical inquiry focused on 
extensive information about the position-taking of political parties in OECD countries since 1960, combined with 
comparable data on income inequalities, and on a range of political economic conditions relevant to anti-globaliza-
tion politics.  The principal ﬁ  nding has been that income inequalities, left unchecked by social-policy protections, 
do indeed tend to spur protectionism, anti-internationalism, and anti-EU backlash in the position-taking of parties.   
Such responses appear to hold net of a wide range of other background conditions, and appear to hold regardless 
of ex ante openness, party color, or other political-economic conditions.  An important ﬁ  nding, however, is that 
such effects need not and are not always left unchecked.  Redistributive social policies and other provisions ap-
pear in the above analysis to cushion how inequality plays out for globalization politics.  Pre-tax and pre-transfer 
inequality has substantively stronger spurring effects for anti-globalization backlash when ex ante social policies 
are modest than when such policies are generous.  
 These  ﬁ  ndings should be seen as part of a larger research agenda focused on socio-economy of anti-
globalization backlash.  Further inquiry should develop and explore other measures and manifestations of anti-
globalization backlash among parties – beyond anti-EU integration, trade protectionism, and international en-
gagement generally.  It should also focus on the implications of inequality that are up- and down-stream from the 
party-positioning investigated here.  More upstream are the individual and group attitudes and interactions that 
inequality plausibly unleashes – for instance in studies of public opinion on subjective insecurities and economic 
hardship, and on European integration, anti-immigration, and nationalism.  And more downstream might be stud-
ies of how inequality and party-positioning on anti-globalization affect protectionist or nationalist policies of na-
tion states.  The present study, however, provides important information on inequality and globalization politics: 
It not only adds an important consequence to the litany of known problems emerging from inequality, but also 
suggests the agency of government policies to mitigate that consequence.Page • 34
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